Federal Tax--Gifts Inter Vivos--Constitutionality (Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. ___ (1929)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 4 
Number 2 Volume 4, May 1930, Number 2 Article 27 
June 2014 
Federal Tax--Gifts Inter Vivos--Constitutionality (Bromley v. 
McCaughn, 280 U.S. ___ (1929)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1930) "Federal Tax--Gifts Inter Vivos--Constitutionality (Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 
U.S. ___ (1929))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 4 : No. 2 , Article 27. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss2/27 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the tax is not levied directly on the instrumentality and does not
affect the proper functioning of the government, it is more difficult to
fit the case to the principle. In a recent decision by the Circuit Court
of Appeals a federal tax on profits derivedfrom the resale of munici-
pal bonds was declared unconstitutional.'" The protective cloak is
thus thrust about that which is without need of protection.
What ultimate effect the Macallen decision will have, no one can
prophesy with any degree of accuracy. This may be due in part to
the lack of judicial candor on the part of the Court on its decision
and to its departure from the course established heretofore. Cer-
tainly the decision has instilled "fear" into the taxing bodies of states
possessing statutes similar to that in question. 17
A. K. B.
FEDERAL TAx-GIFTS INTER VIVOS-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-
Bromley, a resident of the United -States, brought suit to recover a
tax alleged to have been illegally exacted under the Revenue Acts of
1924 and 1926, since repealed, which imposed a tax upon a transfer
of property by gift, inter vivos, not made in contemplation of death.
The plaintiff contended that the tax thus imposed was a direct unap-
portioned tax and therefore unconstitutional because it violated the
third clause of Section 2 and the fourth clause of Section 9 of Article
1 of the Constitution. Held, that the provisions of the Revenue Acts
of 1924 and 1926 relating to taxation by the Federal Government of
gifts inter vivos, levied an excise tax and did not impose such a
direct tax as is prohibited by the Constitution. Bromley v. Mc-
Caughn, 280 U. S. -, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep.-Decided Nov. 25, 1929.
Taxes are of two kinds, direct and indirect. A direct tax is a
tax levied upon the owner of property merely because he happens to
be the owner and not because of any use or disposition he might
make of it; a tax on the property itself.' An indirect tax is one
which is assessed upon commodities before they reach the consumer
and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes,
but as part of the market price of the commodity. Among indirect
taxes fall duties, imposts and excises.2
A direct unapportioned tax being forbidden by Section 2 of
Article 1 of the Constitution which requires "direct taxes to be ap-
" Willcuts, etc. v. Bunn, 35 F.4 (2nd) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). See(1929) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 138.
Graves, The Macallen Decision, N. Y. State Bar Assn. Bull., Dec. 1929.
1Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421 (1913);
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
673 (1894) ; rehearing 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912 (1895).
Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 3rd Revision (Ed. 8) N-Z: "A tax upon certain
kinds of property having reference to their orikin and their intended use is not a
tax on the property but is an excise." Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 619,
22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493 (1902).
TAX COMMENT
portioned" and by Section 9 of the same article which provides that
"no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion
to the census," the tax complained of therefore being unapportioned,
is unconstitutional, if direct.
A tax levied upon the exercise of only one of the powers inci-
dental to ownership of property is an excise and as such falls into
the class of indirect taxes which need not be apportioned and does not
violate any of the provisions of the Constitution.3
The tax in the instant case was levied against a particular use
made by the plaintiff of his property, that of giving it away. This
tax is indistinguishable from the unapportioned tax levied upon the
use of carriages, which tax was declared valid in Hylton v. United
States,4 or the tax on the privilege to use foreign-built yachts upheld
in Billings v. United States.5 Taxes of this nature levied upon the
exercise of a particular power incidental to ownership of property
never having been understood to be direct, the Court -is very reluctant
to curtail or limit by construction the sovereign power of taxation.
The presumption in favor of the constitutionality of any act of
Congress is overcome when the question is free from any reasonable
doubt, and only in the event that there is no reasonable doubt will the
Court hold an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. 6 The power to
tax being the most important power of Government it is doubly
essential to regard this presumption of validity in regard to Revenue
Acts of Congress.
E.S.
GROSS RECEIPTS TAX-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONSTITU-
TIONALITY.-The plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, having a part
of its lines in and over New Jersey roads, transmits messages over
them to places both within and without the state. The state levied a
property and franchise tax of 5% on such part of the gross receipts
received from all the work transacted within the state, as the lines
in the public places bear to the total lines in the state. The lines in
public places are about half of the total lines, fully a quarter of the
total receipts in the intrastate business results from an extensive
interstate commerce. The plaintiff contends that the tax is invalid
inasmuch as it is a direct tax on the gross receipts derived from inter-
state commerce. Held, that the tax sought to be imposed is in viola-
tion of the commerce clause since it is a direct tax on the gross
receipts derived from interstate commerce rather than a franchise
tax on property, using gross receipts as a measure of value of prop-
erty rights in accordance with Constitution N. J., Art. 4, Sec. 7,
Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796) ; Billings v. U. S., supra Note 1.
'Hylton v. U. S., supra Note 3.
Billings v. U. S., supra Note 1.
CNicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 514, 515, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522 (1898).
